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[Abstract] This paper is based on an analysis of electoral support to left-wing movements 
of parties and blocs in Ukraine from 1998 to 2006. It argues that traditional left-wing ideolo-
gies and thereby the position of the left-wing parties have eroded in the political landscape 
of Ukraine. The authors hold that this is due not only to the decline of traditional left-wing 
ideologies in Ukraine’s electorate, but also to the return of a strong managed party for the 
Eastern regions of the country. 
Sergey O. Kisselyov and Geir Flikke*
Further Towards Post-
Communism? From ‘Left’ to Regions
in Ukraine
*  This paper was co-written by Kisselyov and Flikke during Kisselyov’s research stay at the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), August–September 2006. It was subsequently discussed at 
a NUPI – Mohyla Workshop in October 2006.

Introduction 
Judging from the March 2006 elections to the Ukrainian parliament – the 
Supreme Rada – the left-wing movements and parties are experiencing a cri-
sis.1 True, some of the actors of this movement vociferously oppose any 
such suggestions, stressing how, after the collapse of the Communist system, 
left-wing ideas have experienced a renaissance as a tool for governing the 
state in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia. But the Ukrainian election results 
speak differently. The traditional left-wing parties are on a downward slope, 
and new parties are challenging these parties’ ‘hunting domains’. Although 
the 2006 elections returned the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the 
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) to the Rada, and also to government with 
the Party of Regions, relations between these parties are ambiguous and 
based on votes from the Russia-friendly Eastern regions of the country.  
This paper combines an analysis of the electoral system of Ukraine with 
Edward Shils’ theory on elite competition for control over the state institu-
tions and symbolic power of the centre. The rise of the Party of Regions has 
introduced a new strongly managed political party in Ukraine that challenges 
the left-wing parties, while in essence representing the same values as these 
parties. (Ragozin, 2006: 44.) Thus, the suggestion that Orange coalition 
mismanagement may have brought back former Kuchma politicians into of-
fice seems true, at least after the Yanukovich coalition entered government 
in August 2006. (See for instance Kuzio, 2006.) On the other hand, the new 
proportional electoral system will create incentives for parties that may push 
Ukraine further on the road toward post-Communism and force the Eastern 
regional elites to accept the new electoral system as the ‘only game in town’. 
To be sure, this will depend on the outcome of the debates over constitu-
tional reforms and government prerogatives. The Party of Regions has been 
pursuing an absolutist strategy aimed at reducing presidential powers and 
gaining decisive power over presidential ministries. The crucial question is 
whether certain issues will be removed from policies and to backroom hud-
dles, or put out to the people in terms of clear choices and structured political 
conflict. Abandoning hegemonic partisan rhetoric and confrontational politi-
cal demands will be the true test of Ukraine’s transition. 
We start by arguing that Ukraine is a special case in the comparative di-
mension of post-Communism, and that theorists should not see Ukraine and 
Russia as following identical paths in the post-Communist space. Although 
recent studies on ‘virtual democracies’ have maintained that Ukraine’s tran-
sition has been managed to the same degree as that of Russia (Wilson, 2006) 
and even that the 2004 presidential elections have revealed fingerprints of 
manipulation similar to Russia (Myagkov et al. 2005), we hold that the de-
cline of Communist parties in Ukraine and the incentives of the new elec-
toral system may place the country on a different trajectory.  
                                                 
1  By ‘left-wing parties’ we understand the CPU and the SPU. The Progressive-Socialist 
Party of Ukraine (PSPU) also belongs here, but will not be analysed, since it failed to 
cross the threshold in the 1998 elections. 
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Post-Communism – One Size Fits All? 
Post-Communism is a slippery concept in the burgeoning literature on the 
post-Soviet space. Its ultimate purpose is to provide theories for understand-
ing transitions in an area formerly dominated by the single-party structure of 
the Soviet Union, its ideology and its hegemonic reach into Eastern Europe. 
This involves both the aspect of comparison between systems of the same 
region, and a distinction between the new, unexplored empirical field of 
Eurasia and the Latin American states that gave birth to the extensive theo-
ries of transitions in the so-called ‘second wave’ of democratization. To the 
extent that transition studies have been applied on the post-Communist 
states, this has been under the following conditions: unlike the Latin Ameri-
can countries, the post-Communist states all emerged from beneath the rub-
ble of a system heavy on ideology and state control. Moreover, they were 
new states, with only limited experience as independent ones, and thus 
forced to make a transition within several fields at the same time. 
Clearly, the built-in assumption that the Communist system and ideology 
has been dismantled in the space of the former Soviet Union has in no way 
engendered an assumption that all post-Communist states are now underway 
to a clear-cut transition toward democracy. In fact, re-building the state may 
be the overriding priority for some of them – Putin’s Russia being a promi-
nent example. The simultaneous transitions in Russia proper have produced 
a feeble party system that in the 1990s was more multi than consolidated, a 
fractured civil society and a strong presidency, which under Putin has sought 
to exert heavy influence on politics in bordering states – Ukraine included.  
Subsequently, the erstwhile argument that ‘institutions matter’ has been 
severely undermined by Russia’s aborted transition. A comparison of the 
post-Communist systems with the Soviet past may inspire some to suggest 
that the installation of competitive elections was the most important institu-
tional change in the post-Soviet space (Remington, 2004: 14–15; McFaul, 
2005). Others, however, find their performance in Russia less convincing. 
As observed by Lilia Shevtsova (2006), ‘Russia’s experience has clearly un-
dermined a basic assumption of the transition paradigm: the determinative 
importance of elections’. As the Russian case has unfolded, the assumption 
that what happens between elections has proven fundamentally important, as 
it is in the period between elections that the hegemonic structures of control 
and manipulations that characterize a competitive authoritarian regime are 
made. (See for instance Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002.) 
While institutions may perform differently, one can also question whether 
there are ideological variations that may capture distinct features in post-
Communist transitions – or whether ideology simply does not play any role 
at all. This in turn raises the question whether a distinction between right 
wing, left wing and centrists is at all applicable to post-Communist transi-
tions, not least since traditional Communists have moved rightwards. (See 
Sakwa, 1998; March 2001; and Flikke, 1999.) While the classical scheme for 
most post-Communist analysis has been that of left-wing radicals, right-wing 
conservatives and centrism, which could be understood as a compromise 
between conservatism and radicalism, it is hard to distinguish between what 
is ‘traditional’ and what is ‘radical’ in the former Soviet space. In the rela-
tional game between these alternatives, the ‘centrist’ position has even 
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sculpted itself as distinctly ‘non-ideological’, with the reformists as their 
‘radical’ counterpart (McFaul, 1993). Voting in parliament may give a more 
accurate picture of ‘radical’, ‘centrist’ and ‘conservative’ preferences (see 
Arel, 1994.) Add to this the low survival rate of erstwhile reformist political 
parties and the constant re-invention of various ‘centrist’ alternatives, and 
the field of ideologies becomes limited to what various elites see themselves 
and competitors as representing in an elite context – not what they actually 
represent in terms of popular mandates.  
Should political developments Ukraine be any different from Russia’s in 
this respect, or does the post-Communist paradigm represent ‘one size fits 
all’? Some differences are obvious. 
  
1. Firstly, in the Ukrainian context, there has been no explicitly ‘national’ 
brand of Communism. The argument of independent nationhood has been 
taken on by movements which, from the beginning of 1991 and earlier in 
dissident circles, defended a radical change of the political system on a 
wave of protests against the Soviet system. Movements like Rukh have 
held the flag of nationhood and language high in post-Communist 
Ukraine, effectively fencing out any transformation of the former Com-
munists to a nationalist ideology. Subsequently, the Communists in 
Ukraine have been embedded in a clearly distinct region of the country – 
its industrialized Eastern parts, associated with the influence of traditional 
Russian culture and language. Hence, to a large extent their collective in-
centives2 have been associated with a specific brand of regional manage-
ment values stemming from Eastern Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian Commu-
nists are intertwined with the fate of the elites of the Eastern region, and 
have little support in the more independence-minded Western parts of the 
country.  
2. Secondly, even if there has been a distinct type of ‘centrism’ in post-
Communist Ukraine, the statehood focus of centrist blocs has been ori-
ented toward independence and sovereignty. As these blocs have largely 
been state-builders rather than nation-builders, they have not seen this 
process as being detached from the question of being a separate and inde-
pendent state.3 In fact, research on voting patterns in the Rada has re-
vealed that the language issue, which has mobilized parties on issues of 
nationhood and independence, was not an independent variable explain-
ing the vote on independence in the early 1990s. To the extent that spo-
ken language mattered, it was on issues that involved economic and cul-
tural ties to Russia. (Arel, 1994: 152.)  
3. Thirdly, unlike Russia, the attempt to ‘manage’ a hand-over of presiden-
tial powers to a new ‘party of power’ from the regions backfired in 
Ukraine in 2002–2004, creating the huge elite divisions evidenced by the 
                                                 
2  For a definition of this term, see Angelo Panebianco (1988): 10. Panebianco holds that 
parties are hierarchies that offer complex, immaterial incentives for association – identity, 
solidarity and ideology being the main ingredients. It remains to be discussed whether the 
regional dimension in Ukraine is an incentive of identity.  
3  In fact, many theorists claim that Ukrainian post-Communist nation-building has been led 
by the state, and that the focus on building institutions is the main driver in securing long-
term unification of a split nation. See D’Anieri and Kuzio (2002).  
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Orange Autumn of 2004.4 This rupture was clearly about not jeopardizing 
democracy for state-building and elite-governed backstage deals. Thus, in 
2002–2004 the centrist position found itself in crisis. State-building 
through the presidency has not reduced divisions in the elite and the party 
system, but rather increased them.  
4. Finally, Ukraine is the only post-Communist country that has taken the 
step toward a fully proportional system. While the March 2006 ‘founding 
elections’ brought back the Party of Regions, the subsequent transition 
toward a proportional electoral system can be expected to lessen the pos-
sibilities of forming ‘state-saving’ centrist factions in parliament, and 
thus increase the significance of party allegiance. Attempts to build a 
state-building ‘centrist’ faction on administrative presidential resources 
may not be possible if a stricter system of factional alignment is intro-
duced in the Rada. Whereas the ‘centrist’ label has come to designate a 
blurring of traditional ideologies and party lines, and the subsequent crea-
tion of ‘catch-all’ administrative parliamentary blocs, a strong propor-
tional system is likely to lead to a narrowing down of the space for politi-
cal back-stage manoeuvring – at least if it is consistently applied. 
 
An analysis of the 1998–2006 electoral cycles reveals a move from Commu-
nism that clearly marks a de-ideologization of politics. Socialist parties, in 
decline since 1998, have now been replaced by new political forces. A par-
tial explanation may be found in the fact that the electoral system has con-
tributed to the formation of a cluster of non-partisan elites from the Eastern 
regions. In the following we will discuss the general framework of the elec-
toral mechanism and the downward spiral of left-wing parties since 1998.  
The Mixed Electoral System: Favouring Regional Values? 
There are numerous ways to conceptualize the performance of electoral sys-
tems in transitional countries. On one hand, the electoral system is widely 
considered to be ‘the most specific manipulative instrument of politics’.5 
This has generated significant interest in both the process of adoption of 
these electoral systems, and also the effect of systems that mixed propor-
tional systems (PR) and single mandate elections (SMD), like that adopted in 
post-Communist Russia in 1993, and also Ukraine in 1997. Importantly, 
findings from post-Communist Russia have offered no clear-cut conclusions 
concerning the effect on the political landscape of a mixed PR and SMD 
formula (Moser, 1997). As suggested by Robert Moser, ‘proportional repre-
sentation has strengthened political parties, whereas plurality elections have 
fostered an influx of independent candidates that has undermined the role of 
parties’ (ibid: 285). This is basically due to the fact that in post-Communist 
Russia, factions were formed partly as caucuses in the Duma after the found-
                                                 
4  In popular consciousness, left-wingers are Communists, or those who share their values, 
whereas the right wing consists of those who share the opposite values. To this we could 
add the trivial assumption that any political ideology is first and foremost a system of po-
litical values, in this case a system of clearly opposing political values. 
5  Giovanni Sartori, quoted in Lijphart (1994): 139. Lijphart rightly adds that the degree of 
manipulation  depends on the willingness of politicians to apply the electoral system as a 
system of managing elections. Roughly said, we suggest that this may be more frequent in 
transitional states than in established democracies. 
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ing elections of 1993, and partly because ‘centrist’ caucuses were built suc-
cessively throughout 1994–1995 on resources stemming from the govern-
ment and the presidential apparatus. 
A second option is to see the establishment of new electoral systems as 
the most consistent change in the post-Communist political systems arising 
in 1990–91, and as an institution that ‘institutionalizes uncertainty’ (McFaul, 
2005). Post-Communist elections are uncertain in terms of outcomes, this 
argument goes, yet the fundamental change in institutions may alter the 
norms and behaviour of elites, so transitional countries may consequently 
develop hybrid regimes – or electoral democracies. This implies that the in-
stitution of competing for votes becomes the norm, not the exception. Hence, 
transitional studies claim that the electoral institution itself is a way of ensur-
ing a ‘definiteness of rules, and the indefiniteness of outcomes’ (Sakwa, 
2005: 16). 
While the introduction of competitive elections is beyond doubt the major 
institutional change that distinguishes the Soviet system from a post-
Communist one, studies of the effect of electoral systems on elite behaviour 
may be rendered difficult by frequent changes in the electoral system itself. 
Ukraine is a case in point: it has passed from a two-round single-mandate 
system in the 1990 elections to a mixed single-mandate and proportional 
system adopted by the Rada in October 1997 and put into practice in the 
1998 and 2002 elections, and finally a proportional system in 2006. (Arel, 
1994: 128; Ragozin, 2005). Thus, the institution of regular elections may 
have produced differing incentives for parties and political forces throughout 
the period, hampering the formation of consistent political blocs and parties. 
Rather than institutionalizing uncertainty, the institution itself may have 
been a source of increased uncertainty and increased elite competition. 
Moreover, a feature of transitional countries may be that the electoral fabric 
itself can be used to create definite outcomes through the very indefiniteness 
of rules. The art of ‘electoral engineering’ subsequently becomes not only an 
art of choosing a system for elections, but also of employing the system as a 
tool for elite struggles. When elites based on certain opposing political val-
ues clash, the electoral system itself is the loser.6  
Here we take as our point of departure the fact that Ukraine’s 1998 par-
liamentary elections were conducted according to a mixed SMD and PR sys-
tem where 225 deputies from parties and blocs were elected on the basis of a 
proportional system in a federal electoral region and 225 were elected in 
SMDs. In effect, the SMD system allowed politicians to self-nominate, given 
a sufficient number of signatures and substantial regional funding.  
A distinct structural trait of the Ukrainian mixed system may have given 
an advantage to the populous regions in the East. The population of Ukraine 
is not uniformly distributed, so the number of SMDs varied from region to 
region. In Donetsk, there were 23 SMDs, meaning that this region could 
bring 23 deputies to the Rada. In the West, however, Chernovitsky oblast 
had only four SMDs. The seven Western oblasts of Volhynsk, Zakarpatya, 
Ivano-Frankovsk, L’vov, Rovensk, Ternopol and Chernovitsky had a total of 
42 SMDs, whereas Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts had 35 SMDs. When we 
                                                 
6  This is evidenced in a recent study of ‘fingerprints’ in the Ukrainian and Russian elections 
of 2000 and 2004 (Myagkov et al. 2005). 
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include Kharkov oblast, the total is 49 SMDs, and with Dnipropetrovsk – 66. 
Thus, the Western regions had altogether 18.67% of 225 deputies elected in 
SMDs, while three of the Eastern regions had together 21.78% of the SMDs. 
Of the eight regions with more than ten SMDs, six were in the East and the 
South. (See Table 1.) 
 
Table 1: Number of SMDs in Regions 
Oblast Number of SMDs 
Donetsk 23 
Dnepropetrovsk 17 
Kharkov 14 
Lugansk 12 
Lvov 12 
Kiev City 12 
Odessa 11 
ARC (Crimea) 10 
Zaporozhya   9 
Vinnitsa   8 
Kiev   8 
Poltava   8 
Khmelnitsky   7 
Cherkassk   7 
Zhitomyr   6 
Ivano-Frankovsk   6 
Mykolaev   6 
Sumy   6 
Kherson   6 
Chernigovsk   6 
Volhynsk   5 
Zakarpatya   5 
Kirovograd   5 
Rovensk   5 
Ternopol   5 
Chernovitsky   4 
Sevastopol City   2 
Total     225 
 
This could be expected to have a significant impact on the formation of po-
litical values and preferences in the Rada, and imply that the political spec-
trum in the SMD part of the Rada was more likely to be defined by Donbass 
than Bukovina. Eastern regional values such as language, religious confes-
sion and relations to other cultures (Russia and the Western influence) would 
consequently matter.7 Thus, given the fact that there were more SMDs in the 
                                                 
7  This divide is analysed elsewhere. In brief: contemporary cultural values in Galitsiya, 
especially around L’vov, have reflected the influence of Poland. The cultural values of 
Bukovina have been shaped by the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Monar-
chy, of which it was a part. Here influences from Hungarian and Romanian cultures are 
evident. In the Zakarpatya, the influence of Hungary has traditionally been strong. Subse-
quently, the values of the highly industrialized regions Eastern parts of Ukraine, espe-
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Eastern regions than in the West of Ukraine, one could hypothesize that the 
culture of the industrialized East would have a greater impact on the forma-
tion of political values in the Ukrainian state.  
While differences in values could be thoroughly evidenced only through 
a roll-call analysis evaluating the impact of linguistic issues on voting in the 
Rada,8 a breakdown of faction alignment stemming from the mixed SMD 
and PR elections to the 1998 Rada suggests several things (see Table 2). On 
the face of things, the 1998 elections meant a triumph for traditional left-
wing parties, upheld by their regional base in the Eastern parts of Ukraine. 
The Communist Party of Ukraine was the undoubted leader, having received 
124 mandates in parliament, 27.6% of the total mandates of the Rada (445) 
and overall 46.42% of the vote in the proportional elections.9  
 
Table 2: 1998 Election Results and Seats in the Rada 
Blocs and parties Percentage 
in PR Elec-
tions 
Seats from 
PR Elec-
tions 
SMD 
Seats 
Total Seats in 
Rada (March 
1998) 
CPU 24.65 84 40 124 
Peoples’ Movement of Ukraine 
(Rukh) 
9.4 32 14 46 
SPU and PPU Bloc 8.55 29 5 34 
Green Party of Ukraine 5.43 19 – 19 
Peoples’ Democratic Party 5.01 17 6 23 
Hromada 4.67 16 4 20 
PSPU 4.04 14 1 15 
SDPU(u) 4.01 14 3 17 
Party of Regions – – 1 1 
Others   22 22 
Independents (self-nomination)   129 129 
Total  225 225 450 
 
The Communists had a strong election in the Eastern parts of the country, 
thus reflecting the ‘birth marks’ of this political force after its renaissance in 
1993.10 After the banning of the Communist Party of Ukraine in 1991, the 
revived party held its founding congress in Donetsk on 19 June 1993. The 
imprint of this region was kept, and in 1998 it blossomed in a virtual eupho-
ria for the return of the left. As one leader of the CPU, also a member of the 
central committee, claimed a few months after the 1998 elections: ‘We have 
won back the power in these elections, and we will never give it to anyone 
                                                 
cially Donbass (Donetsk, Lugansk oblast’) have traditionally been closer to the Russian 
culture.  
8  Data for such a roll-call analysis may be available, however, and should serve as a back-
bone for analyzing the linguistic factor as an independent variable in the formation of po-
litical identities in the Rada.  
9   http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0  
10  Angelo Panebianco (1988: 50) holds that the circumstances that give birth to a political 
organization are likely to leave an imprint on the party for years to come. This argument 
is basically about the fact that each party has its own ‘genetic model’ relating to the bal-
ance between centre control (penetration) and regional germination (diffusion). In that 
sense, then, the CPU definitely has a ‘regional’ imprint in Ukrainian politics that may in-
dicate a strong case of diffusion, had it not been for the fact that it was certainly a party 
that emanated from the centre.  
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again’.11 The Communists were the leading party in 19 oblasts, including the 
city oblasts of Sevastopol and Kiev (Table 3). In Sevastopol alone the CPU 
received 45.99% of the vote. In Lugansk, they received 45.97% and in the 
Autonomous Region of Crimea (ARC) 39.34%. If we exclude the Western 
regions, the CPU came in second in only three oblasts – Dnepropetrovsk, 
Khmelnitsky and Cherkassk. Although number one in Kiev, they garnered a 
mere 14.14% of the vote here. In the West, the CPU had a poor showing. In 
Volhynsk, Rovensk and Zakarpatiya, the CPU came in third, with 9.21%, 
7.55% and 6.54% respectively. In Galitsiya, CPU returns were relatively 
meagre. In L’vov the CPU had 4.09% of the vote (7th place); in Ivano-
Frankovsk, 2.99% (8th) and in Ternopol, 2.9% and (8th).12 
 
Table 3: Regional breakdown of CPU Results in 1998 Rada Elections (pro-
portional)13 
Region in Ukraine Valid votes 
cast (N) 
Votes for CPU 
(N) 
Percentage Regional 
rating 
Sevastopol City Oblast 153 773 70 724 45.99 1 
Lugansk 1 355 712 623 297 45.97 1 
Autonomous Region of Crimea 
(ARC) 
977 768 384 666 39.34 1 
Nikolayevsk 663 341 257 893 38.87 1 
Kharkov 1 537 506 545 665 35.49 1 
Donetsk 2 414 935 856 323 35.45 1 
Kherson 623 042 213 980 34.34 1 
Zaporozhya 1 043 761 334 197 32.01 1 
Chernigovsk 795 378 240 976 30.29 1 
Kirovograd 671 614 195 756 29.14 1 
Odessa 1 242 212 350 744 28.23 1 
Dnepropetrovsk 1 917 089 491 172 25.62 2 
Sumy 772 314 196 413 25.43 1 
Vinnitsa 1 064 300 265 159 24.91 1 
Poltava 1 007 836 239 349 23.74 1 
Zhitomyr 852 270 198 515 23.29 1 
Khmelnitsky 901 450 191 272 21.21 2 
Kiev oblast 1024747 211 245 20.61 1 
Chernovitsky 499038 100 718 20.18 1 
Chekassk 837 656 158 665 18.94 2 
Kiev City Oblast 1 163 633 164 608 14.14 1 
Volhynsk 610 205 56 205 9.21 3 
Rovensk 673 119 50 881 7.55 3 
Zakarpatiya 607 852 40 378 6.64 3 
L’vov 1 593 269 65 283 4.09 7 
Ivano-Frankovsk 830 968 24 906 2.99 8 
Ternopol 736 485 21 363 2.90 8 
Ukraine 26 571 273 6 550 353 24.65 1 
                                                 
11  Personal communication to Sergiy Kisselyov. 
12   http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0 
13  The table is sorted on percentage support in the various regions of Ukraine. 
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The CPU had less success in the SMD elections, but results here repeated the 
picture of an East–West division. The CPU returned 2 mandates of 10 in 
ARC, 1 of 8 in Vinnitsa, 3 of 17 in Dnepropetrovsk, 7 of 23 in Donetsk, 1 of 
6 in Zhitomyr, 3 of 9 in Zaporozh’e, 8 of 12 in Lugansk, 2 of 11 in Odessa, 3 
of 8 in Poltava 1 of 6 in Sumy, 2 of 12 in Kharkov, 1 of 6 in Kherson, 1 of 7 
in Khmelnitsky, 2 of 7 in Cherkask and 1 of 2 in Sevastopol (Table 2).14  
The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) entered the 1998 parliamentary 
elections with the support of the Peasant Party of Ukraine (PPU). The bloc 
For truth, the people and Ukraine received 29 mandates in proportional 
elections, and 5 in SMDs. Further, the SPU received one SMD as a party, 
giving them a total of 35 deputies in the Rada.15 The bloc came in first in 
two oblasts, Cherkassk and Khmelnitsky, with 25.95% and 21.26%, respec-
tively, of the vote. In seven oblasts it came in second: Poltava (21.3%), Vin-
nitsa (19.7%), Chernigovsk (18.83%), Kirovograd (17.27%), Kiev (16.16%), 
Zhitomyr (15.19%) and Kherson (11.23%) (Table 4). As with the CPU, the 
bloc had less support in the Western regions, in 9th place in Zakarpatiya, 11th 
in Ternopol, 9th in Ivano-Frankovsk and 11th in L’vov. The most marked dif-
ferences in patterns were found in Donetsk, where the SPU bloc came in 13th 
place and in ARC and Sevastopol, where the bloc came in 9th place. Of the 
34 deputies in the Rada, the SPU had 15, the PPU 14, adding to this 2 man-
dates in the SMDs and 3 mandates in the SMDs from the SPU (Kiev – Alek-
sandr Moroz, Kherson – Stanislav Nikolaenko, and Khmelnitsky – Ivan 
Chizh).  
                                                 
14  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0 
15  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0  
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Table 4: Regional breakdown of SPU Results in 1998 Rada Elections (pro-
portional)16 
Region in Ukraine Valid votes cast (N) Votes for the 
SPU (N) 
Percentage Regional 
rating 
Cherkassk 837 656 217 453 25.95 1 
Poltava 1 007 836 214 721 21.30 2 
Khmelnitsky 901 450 191 690 21.26 1 
Vinnitsa 1 064 300 209 676 19.70 2 
Chernigovsk 795 378 150 625 18.93 2 
Kirovograd 671 614 116 040 17.27 2 
Kiev oblast 1 024 747 165 691 16.16 2 
Zhitomyr 852 270 129 464 15.19 2 
Sumy 772 314 100 783 13.04 3 
Kherson 623 042 70 024 11.23 2 
Odessa 1 242 212 91 838 7.39 3 
Chernovitsky 499 038 33 185 6.64 4 
Rovensk 673 119 43 991 6.53 4 
Volhynsk 610 205 36 475 5.97 5 
Kharkov 1 537 506 90 979 5.91 4 
Nikolayevsk 663 341 37 133 5.59 5 
Zaporozhya 1 043 761 54 473 5.21 6 
Lugansk 1 355 712 70 619 5.20 3 
Kiev City Oblast 1 163 633 54 123 4.65 7 
Dnepropetrovsk 1 917 089 60 868 3.17 5 
Zakarpatiya 607 852 14 515 2.38 9 
Ternopol 736 485 15 319 2.08 11 
Ivano-Frankovsk 830 968 16 676 2.00 9 
Donetsk 2 414 935 43 116 1.78 13 
L’vov 1 593 269 25 988 1.63 11 
Autonomous Region of Crimea 
(ARC) 
977 768 15 926 1.62 9 
Sevastopol City Oblast 153 773 2 397 1.55 9 
Ukraine 26 571 273 2 273 788 8.55 3 
 
The left-wing parties thus experienced a renaissance in the 1998 elections, 
based partly on electoral support in regions with a traditional set of regional 
values, but they failed to create a common left-wing bloc. Since 1998, the 
CPU and SPU have accused each other of being ‘opportunist’, ‘revisionists’ 
and what-not, in the competition for the same socialist votes.  
This was especially evident in the 1999 presidential elections. The com-
petitors for the presidential post did not receive a sufficient number of votes 
in the first round, as the vote returned Kuchma as the leader, with Pyotr Si-
monenko (CPU) at second, and Oleksandr Moroz (SPU) at third. Hypotheti-
cally, the CPU and SPU could have cut a deal on the basis of the fact that the 
CPU had received the maximum of what it could expect, and thus leave the 
second round to Moroz. However, the left-wing parties were unable to ‘di-
                                                 
16  The table is sorted on percentage support in the various regions of Ukraine. 
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vide the cake’ in this way. And so, Symonenko entered into the second 
round and lost to Kuchma, starting the long decline of the left wing in 
Ukraine.  
No less interesting is the fact that after the 1998 elections, 129 SMD 
deputies were without any clear factional alignment, leaving the Eastern re-
gional dimension unaccounted for in terms of party affiliation. Since Rukh 
had few representatives from SMDs, the Western value system was not rep-
resented among independents. Hence, at a time when the regional elites had 
not yet consolidated, the electoral system and the East/West distribution of 
SMDs tilted in favour of the values of the East, but without uniting these in a 
single political bloc. 
Thus, the significant result of the left-wing parties also marked the im-
pending crisis in left-wing ideas. Together, the CPU and SPU could have 
created the basis for a ‘ruling class’, with the subsequent diffusion of leftist 
ideas and values into society. As this did not happen, the field was left open 
for other contenders from the Eastern regions.17 This was evidenced in the 
2002 elections. 
Elite competition: The Beginning of the End for the Left, 
1998–2002 
Elite competition can be expected to increase in electoral campaigns and 
during the formation of a parliament and a government. In transition theo-
ries, this competition is linked to norm internalization – i.e. that democracy 
becomes a true incentive for elites to the degree that these abide by the for-
mal rules and avoid backstage deals. If they do, norms change, and this may 
again lead to changes in deeply embedded political cultures.18  
Traditional elite perspectives have been more prone to see electoral com-
petition as reflecting competing elites and regional cultures, which again are 
mobilized in electoral races. In this view, the electoral struggle is a function 
of elite mobilization – the struggle to form a ruling class of elites and the 
subsequent transformation of elite interests into state interests. In this case, 
competition does not end with the formation of a ruling class. In the opposi-
tion between centre and periphery, the ruling elite will not only make use of 
the advantage of being in power, but also strive to elevate regional values, 
including cultural ones, to the level of state values.  
Edward Shils has observed that the division between centre and periphery 
is especially strong in causing elite mobilization, which articulates itself in a 
struggle over the values of the centre, and also the vales of the institutions: 
                                                 
17  True, the development of the right-centrist forces showed a similar trajectory. In 1998, 
they were unable to unite around common values. Thus the 2002 parliamentary elections 
mark two important tidal changes in Ukrainian politics. The first is the decline of the left 
wing, first and foremost the Communists. Second, the right-centrist forces that had suc-
cess in the elections were merely a preliminary stage in the formation of new elites in 
Ukraine. To this we should add that the successful use of administrative resources in the 
2002 elections in the SMD districts led this technology being embodied in the presidential 
elections in 2004. The fact that this technology was made an aim in itself does not mean 
that it was a success or that it could be used without restrictions. Indeed, it created the Or-
ange Revolution, which to some extent prolonged the life of those elites that had gained 
the upper hand in the 2002 elections, but were unable to build a coalition. 
18  See for instance Diamond (1999: 166), who holds that the adherence to ‘proceduralism’ is 
mandatory in understanding the degree of democracy in democratizing states.  
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‘The central value system is constituted by the values which are pursued and 
affirmed by the elites of the constituent subsystems and of the organizations 
which are comprised in the subsystems’ (1975: 48). Shils holds that the three 
components defining the politics of the centre are values and beliefs, institu-
tions, and finally elites. The elites are normally characterized by passivity 
with regard to the centre, unless the centre offers possibilities for determin-
ing the values of society and the state. Should the centre be incapable of de-
fining these values, other regional elites will seek to form a ruling class.  
Shils’ theory has been criticized for not relating to transitional countries, 
but it still sufficiently explains processes that have been and are at work in 
Ukraine since from 2000 (see Migdal, 2005). Towards the 2002 elections, 
two distinct regional elite groups were gradually built up, around former 
Minister of Finance, Viktor Yushchenko, and various president-initiated 
state-saving projects leaning on support from the Eastern elite. The new cy-
cle of elite struggles for control over the centre decimated support for the 
left-wing parties and introduced a new democratization agenda at the ex-
pense of traditional patronage values. Thus, in the 2002 election results, we 
observe a clear decline in the popularity of left wing values. True, the CPU 
came in second place, tailing the powerful bloc of Victor Yushchenko, Our 
Ukraine. In the proportional elections the CPU gained 19.98% of the vote, 
and received 59 seats in the Rada (Table 5).19 But in the proportional elec-
tions alone, the CPU lost 25 mandates. In the SMDs the CPU continued to 
lose ground as well, with only one mandate from the ACR (10), one in Dne-
propetrovsk (16), one in Donetsk (23), one in Zaporozhya (9), and one in 
Sumy (6). In addition, the CPU had one deputy – Sergey Sinchenko –in the 
109th electoral district in Lugansk, although he was elected as ‘non-partisan’. 
All in all, the CPU received only 15.38% of the mandates the party had 
gained in SMDs in the 1998 elections. 
                                                 
19  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v  
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Table 5: 2002 Election Results and Seats in the Rada 
Blocs and parties Percentage 
PR elections 
Seats from 
PR elections 
SMD 
seats 
Total Seats 
March 2002 
Total seats 
January 2004 
Our Ukraine 23.57 70 42 112 102 
CPU 19.98 59 6 65 59 
Tymoshenko Bloc 7.26 22 – 22 19 
SPU 6.87 20 2 22 20 
For a United Ukraine 11.77 35 86 121 Split after elec-
tions 
Regions of Ukraine     67 
Labour Ukraine     42 
Democratic Initiatives     18 
Peoples’ Power     22 
Agrarian Party     14 
Peoples’ Democratic 
Party 
    16 
Peoples’ Choice     14 
SDPU(u) 6.27 19 8 27 36 
Subtotal    148 229 
Independents   80 80 20 
Total in Rada    449 449 
Source: Karatnycky (2006): 35 
 
The geographical dimension did not change substantially. The only thing 
that should have been of concern to the CPU, but that did not concern them, 
was the fact that in Donetsk they tailed the pro-presidential bloc For a 
United Ukraine, gaining 29.78% there. At any rate, the CPU came in first in 
Lugansk (39.68%), ARC (33.91%), and Zaporozhya (33.4%). Although the 
CPU came first in Sevastopol, there was a significant decline in support – 
from 45.99% in 1998 to 32.73% in 2002 (Table 6). An interesting change 
was seen in Dnepropetrovsk, where the CPU rose from second to first place 
and received 31.86% of the vote, due to an internal crisis in the Hromada 
party of Pavel Lazarenko. In Kherson, Kharkov, Nikolayev, Odessa and Ki-
rovograd, the CPU also came in first place with 31.59%, 30.69%, 29.29%, 
26.2% and 22.24%, respectively, of the vote (Table 6).20  
The CPU fared substantially worse in the Western regions: in Ternopol 
(1.55%), Ivano-Frankovsk (1.94%), L’vov (2.63%), Volhynsk (5.32%), 
Rovensk (5.34%) and Zakarpatiya (5.96%). For Kiev and Vinnitsa, the re-
sults were 9.04% and 11.72%. In all these oblasts, the CPU came in fourth 
place. As there were only five parties and blocs that managed to cross the 
threshold, the result tells a story of decline.  
                                                 
20  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/WEBPROC16V?kodvib=400&kodpart=140  
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Table 6: Regional breakdown of CPU Results in 2002 Rada Elections (pro-
portional) 
Region in Ukraine Valid votes 
cast (N) 
Votes for 
CPU (N) 
Percentage Regional 
rating 
Lugansk 1 282 274 508 862 39.68 1 
Autonomous Region of Crimea 
(ARC) 
962 493 326 451 33.91 1 
Zaporozhya 1 004 699 335 616 33.40 1 
Sevastopol City Oblast 177 043 57 951 32.73 1 
Dnepropetrovsk 1 843 289 587 386 31.86 1 
Kherson 600 052 189 575 31.59 1 
Kharkov 1 492 514 458 139 30.69 1 
Donetsk 2 482 577 739 471 29.78 2 
Nikolayevsk 633 121 185 498 29.29 1 
Odessa 1 132 260 296 758 26.20 1 
Kirovograd 635 228 141 286 22.24 1 
Zhitomyr 797 864 150 399 18.85 2 
Poltava 964 626 170 654 17.69 3 
Chernigovsk 750 836 124 886 16.63 2 
Sumy 760 297 125 420 16.49 3 
Khmelnitsky 854 274 115 062 13.46 2 
Cherkassk 794 351 105 665 13.30 3 
Vinnitsa 1 042 566 122 236 11.72 4 
Kiev oblast 1 022 781 110 577 10.81 3 
Kiev City Oblast 1 269 618 114 809 9.04 4 
Chernovitsky 470 755 38 479 8.17 3 
Zakarpatiya 606 977 36 233 5.96 4 
Rovensk 685 367 36 662 5.34 4 
Volhynsk 635 575 33 841 5.32 4 
L’vov 1 505 150 39 664 2.63 4 
Ivano-Frankovsk 797 263 15 496 1.94 4 
Ternopol 705 557 10 998 1.55 4 
Ukraine 25 909 407 5 178 074 19.98 2 
 
As for the SPU, the bloc received 22 mandates in the 2002 elections, 20 in 
the proportional elections, and two mandates in SMD elections in Poltava 
and Kherson. As in 1998, the deputy elected from Kherson was Stanislav 
Nikolaenko. Overall, the SPU came out as the winner of the proportional 
elections only in one oblast – Poltava, with 22.05% of the vote. The SPU 
came in second place in the four oblasts of Vinnitsa (21.26%), Cherkassk 
(18.9%), Kirovograd (15.15%) and Kiev (11.93%). In the North-East of 
Chernigovsk and Sumy, where the SPU ranked third and fourth, it received 
15.13% and 15.08% of the vote. This is more than in Kiev, and more than in 
Kherson, where the SPU ranked as third with 8.21% of the vote. A similar 
situation was seen in Zhitomyr, where the SPU ranked fourth, but gained 
11.13% of the vote.21 This means that, although the SPU clearly lost votes 
                                                 
21  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vd2002/webproc0v  
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compared to the 1998 elections, its electoral geography did not change sub-
stantially. Concerning the number of mandates gained in the 1998 elections, 
however, the SPU received only 62.86% of these in 2002. 
 
Table 7: Regional breakdown of SPU Results in 2002 Rada Elections (pro-
portional) 
 
 
The ‘left-wing’ blocs were still a considerable political force. Since 1999, 
however, they have proved unable to utilize their coalition potential and join 
hands. Shils’ suggestion that elites should consolidate on a set of values in 
order to form a government did not find favour with the Communists from 
1998 and onwards. There might be several reasons for this. Firstly, the coun-
try’s economic growth from 2000 and onwards was led by reform specialists 
in the Kuchma government in the circles around Yushchenko, and these 
Region in Ukraine Valid votes cast 
(N) 
Votes for SPU 
(N) 
Percentage Regio-
nal 
rating 
Poltava 964 626 212 709 22.05 1 
Vinnitsa 1 042 566 221 662 21.26 2 
Cherkassk 794 351 150 504 18.94 2 
Kirovograd 635 228 96 248 15.15 2 
Chernigovsk 750 836 113 615 15.13 3 
Sumy 760 297 114 673 15.08 4 
Kiev oblast 1 022 781 122 088 11.93 2 
Zhitomyr 797 864 88 864 11.13 4 
Khmelnitsky 854 274 74 473 8.71 4 
Kherson 600 052 49 317 8.21 3 
Odessa 1 132 260 85 096 7.51 4 
Nikolayevsk 633 121 34 052 5.37 5 
Kharkov 1 492 514 68 497 4.58 7 
Dnepropetrovsk 1 843 289 81 583 4.42 7 
Kiev City Oblast 1 269 618 54 282 4.27 6 
Rovensk 685 367 22 846 3.33 5 
Zaporozhya 1 004 699 33 012 3.28 8 
Lugansk 1 282 274 40 495 3.15 6 
Chernovitsky 470 755 12 581 2.67 6 
Donetsk 2 482 577 45 285 1.82 6 
Volhynsk 635 575 10 115 1.59 6 
Sevastopol City Oblast 177 043 2 534 1.43 14 
Zakarpatiya 606 977 8 428 1.38 9 
Ivano-Frankovsk 797 263 8 556 1.07 6 
L’vov 1 505 150 15 291 1.01 6 
Ternopol 705 557 6 540 0.92 6 
Autonomous Region of 
Crimea (ARC) 
962 493 7 296 0.75 16 
Ukraine 25 909 407 1 780 642 6.87 5 
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forces transformed their economic victories into a bloc that challenged the 
Kuchma presidency on the basis of West Ukrainian regional values. Apart 
from the obvious fact that Communists were not at the helm of this eco-
nomic programme, the reform programme also mobilized a new industrial-
ized elite in the East to modernize and adopt a new reform agenda that was 
to be coupled with traditional East Ukrainian values.  
Second, as new Ukrainian elites emerged in the Western regions, the 
need for transformed elites appeared also in the East. Representing tradi-
tional left-wing values, the Communists were unable to rise to this challenge, 
being too heavily associated with socialism, and also unable to manage the 
leap toward a new ‘national’ brand of Communism. Consequently, the de-
clining left opened the door to a regional alternative – also from Donetsk. 
The 1998–2002 Elections: The Eastern Regional Elite Regroups 
The rise of a regional alternative is linked to the crisis of the Kuchma presi-
dency from 2000 and onwards. The crisis of ‘Kuchmagate’, and the chal-
lenge from new elites with support in the Western regions, effectively un-
dermined presidential authority and made clear the stark need to bring new 
elites into the equation. Symptomatically, the presidential structures staked 
their bets on the SMD system and created factions in the Rada on this basis 
(Table 5) (Karatnycky, 2006). The Kuchma administration, seeing the chal-
lenge of new elites led by reformers in government as one that would divide 
the country into two parts, subsequently launched the For a United Ukraine 
Bloc to foster a pro-presidential alternative in the Rada, as well as to frame 
the contenders as the instigators of a divisive national policy.  
As elite divisions intensified, we cannot argue that the number of political 
blocs had anything to do with the electoral system itself. In fact, the polariza-
tion between pro-presidential forces in the SMDs and the opposition in the 
proportional elections reflected both a struggle for a new electoral system 
that would reflect the growing influence of political parties in the West 
Ukrainian regions and a struggle over the presidency as such. It also re-
flected a trait more common in presidential elections – the polarization be-
tween two political alternatives and blocs capable of promoting their presi-
dential candidate in a winner-takes-all presidential election. Regional values, 
hitherto associated with SMD elections and the Communist revival, were in 
decline, as opposition parties came out with a more pro-Western and democ-
racy-oriented alternative. The crisis of the left was no doubt a supporting 
factor in the search for new regional alternatives.  
A regional alternative had been in the making from 1997. In assessing the 
electoral success of the Party of Regions from the moment of its creation – 
the founding congress on 26 October 1997, when the Party for Regional Re-
vival was formed – we note the following: The founding congress took place 
in Kiev, although the party from the very beginning was conceived as an 
East Ukrainian political force, or rather a Donetsk party, since its first 
chairman was Vladimir Rybak, mayor of Donetsk. The ‘regionals’ insisted 
that the major difference between the PRR was ‘that it first and foremost has 
defined as its ultimate goal to defend the interests of all regions’.22 Still, the 
                                                 
22  http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/meet/history  
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PPR made a poor showing in the 1998 elections: it ranked 19 of a total of 30 
parties, failed to cross the 4% threshold in the PR elections, and received 
only one seat in the Rada, with Vladimir Rybak passing in the 45th single 
mandate district in Donetsk. 
The ambition to be seen as the defender of regional values was not re-
flected in wide national support. Strange as it may seem, the Party of Re-
gions had its highest support in one Western region in the proportional elec-
tions – Chernovitsky oblast. Here the Party of Regions received about 4.57% 
of the vote and rated number 9. Donetsk came in second in the proportional 
elections. The party ranked number 9 here also, with 2.54% of the vote. All 
in all, the Party of Regions fared poorly in the proportional elections and 
SMD elections in 1998, yet the formation of new regional elites was under-
way. The subsequent dilemma of the 1999 presidential elections may have 
paved the way for considering this alternative. The rivalries between the 
CPU and SPU in the 1999 elections, and the failed attempt to get CPU to 
withdraw its candidate in favour of the more ‘electable’ rival Oleksandr 
Moroz seems to have discredited the left wing in the elite, paving the way 
for the possibility of a new constellation of regional elites (Wilson, 2006: 
239). 
In 2002, opposition forces with an electoral base in Western Ukraine ef-
fectively challenged the left-wing parties both in the proportional elections 
and the SMDs.23 Victor Yushchenko’s bloc Our Ukraine received 23.57% of 
the vote in the proportional elections, and only 11 mandates more than the 
Communists. In the SMDs the ratio was different. Here Our Ukraine sur-
passed the Communists with a ratio of 42:6, giving the bloc 112 mandates in 
the Rada, against 65 from the CPU. This may seem an anomaly, since the 
mixed system actually favoured the Eastern region. The For a United 
Ukraine bloc received half of the mandates of Our Ukraine in the propor-
tional elections (35 mandates), and caught up in the SMDs, where it took 86 
mandates, becoming the largest bloc after the 2002 elections (Table 5). But 
the fingerprints of the presidential administration in this bloc were more than 
evident, as was the futility of having the bloc run in proportional elections. 
As Andrew Wilson puts it, the local machines of the For a United Ukraine 
were a ‘necessary part of the authorities’ “administrative” effort in the con-
stituencies, but they made it much harder to reinvent the bloc for the list 
vote’ (Wilson, 2006: 105). Moreover, its ideological message was ‘too So-
viet, too paternalistic, too “yesterday”’ (ibid.).  
While the Party of the Regions did not run in the elections, it regrouped 
in the Rada on the basis of deputies from For a United Ukraine, which split 
immediately after the 2002 elections (Table 5). Notably, the return of the 
regions was sculpted as a return of a credible presidential candidate when the 
president nominated Viktor Yanukovich as prime minister on 21 November 
2002. The nomination brought the Eastern economic elite back into govern-
ment and politics, this time not on the basis of old left-wing ideals. Indeed, 
                                                 
23  Our Ukraine was basically lifted to victory by the Western regions, which in general do 
not shape the political climate in the country. Thus, in Ivano-Frankovsk oblast, Our 
Ukraine emerged with a proportion of the vote comparable only to Soviet times – 
74.61%. This is a somewhat special record of this time. The changes in the Supreme Rada 
were possible only due to the intense diversity of votes cast in the Southern and Eastern 
regions, where – in addition to the powerful electoral bloc of Yuliya Timoshenko. The 
YyTB gained 22 mandates in the federal electoral district, and none in the SMDs.  
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the decline of the left wing was evident. After the 2002 elections a new pro-
presidential bloc took the helm. However, this bloc basically managed to 
hold itself up thanks to the increasingly authoritarian presidential power that 
none could oppose effectively. Projects like the Ukraine without Kuchma 
proved to be little else than ephemeral soap bubbles, incapable of promoting 
any significant changes for society at large. In the end, the revival of region-
alism came to be associated with reliance on administrative methods and 
‘managed democracy’, which further exacerbated tensions within the elec-
torate.  
Polarization: The 2004 – 2006 Cycle 
Electing a president is the opposite of electing a parliament – or so the books 
say. This was certainly the case with the heated 2004 elections in Ukraine. 
The rise of opposition parties in the parliamentary elections in 2002 – basi-
cally in the proportional elections – and the subsequent consolidation of a 
new Eastern regional bloc prepared the ground for a presidential election 
between two distinct alternatives. While the structure of parliamentary elec-
tions is such that diffusion of votes between several alternatives is likely to 
happen, presidential elections are all about a stand-off of two distinct alter-
natives. (See Moser, 1998.) As with the presidential elections of 1999, 
Ukraine faced a two-round election if none of the alternatives managed to 
gain an absolute majority in the first round. The results of these elections are 
analysed elsewhere. Suffice it to say note that the gradual build-up of the 
East–West campaign, with Eastern governors blocking campaigning from 
the West in the Eastern parts and the Western-based parties rallying for 
comprehensive democratization, created grounds for a rift in the elite that 
again spurred decisive collective action in-between the rounds. In essence, 
the ‘Orange revolution’ was all about elite conflict and subsequent societal 
mobilization. Western Ukraine defended ‘Orange’ values, while the East 
defended traditional administrative power, paternalism and ties with Russia.  
While the issues were old, the contenders were new. Yushchenko and 
Yanukovich appeared first and foremost as presidential candidates and lead-
ers of blocs that were capable of supporting the bid for presidential power. 
The increasing significance of the presidency structured political competi-
tion in the vein of a ‘winner-takes all’ contest (Moser, 1998), where political 
alternatives sculpted themselves either as a coalition of political parties aim-
ing to increase accountability toward the electorate and address questions of 
civil society, or as a more traditional ‘party of power’, aiming to lift East 
Ukrainian issues to the level of state power.  
While the number of civil society organizations engaged in collective ac-
tion and the spirit of the ‘Orange revolution’ was a convincing one, the 
three-round elections in 2004 did not imply a ‘seismic shift Westward in the 
geopolitics of the region’ (Karatnycky, 2005: 35). Subsequent squabbles 
about federal reforms, constitutional reforms and economic policies created 
tensions within the ‘Orange’ government, and led finally to its downfall in 
September 2005. While there might have been many reasons for this, includ-
ing the influence of Russia, the interim period from 2004–2006 confirmed 
the difficulties experienced by all transitions in trying to make several re-
forms simultaneously, without a clear-cut agenda or enough elite consensus 
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about the scope and pace of the transition. President Yushchenko found him-
self caught between the ‘devil and the deep blue sea’ – seeking to preserve 
continuity in government, independence from outspoken political positions, 
the role as a major broker of a divided country, all the while adhering to the 
scheme of electoral reforms. The fatal 2004 elections and subsequent inter-
national condemnations of them may have locked the presidency on abiding 
by the electoral reforms and holding free and fair elections on time. The tool 
for this has been to pact elite differences. The Rada elections have in this 
sense served as a primary incentive for contenders, but also the sole con-
straint that the presidency has been able to exercise on elite competition.  
The fact that the presidency vested authority in defending constitutional 
changes may have set a benchmark for a deeper transformation, making 
regular elections in accordance with a fixed scheme the rule, not the excep-
tion. Two facts may testify to this. Firstly, the ambiguity of Rada deputies 
concerning the formation of an anti-crisis government in August 2006 sug-
gests that political parties have a vested interest in institutions. Secondly, the 
left-wing parties that lost the 2006 parliamentary election play a role as as-
sistants to this new system, both de facto and de jure. Hence, a new political 
system may be about to emerge in Ukraine, putting the country on a post-
Communist track. Notably, the March 2006 elections have confirmed the 
decline of the left-wing parties (Table 8). These parties could have been ex-
pected to do well in a proportional election, given their traditional focus on 
partisanship and ideology. They did not, instead losing votes to the radical 
overnight transformation of the Party of Regions as a party for majoritarian 
SMD elections, to a party for proportional elections. The results testify to the 
return of regional values on a proportional scheme, putting the Party of Re-
gions at the top with 186 mandates, the BYuT with 122 mandates, Our 
Ukraine with 81, the SPU with 33, and the CPU with 21 (Table 8). In the 
new Rada, the left-wing parties have a total of only 54 mandates – as against 
158 in 1998.  
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Table 8: 2006 Election Results and Seats in the Rada 
Parties and blocs Percentage PR 
elections 
Seats from PR 
Elections 
SMD 
seats24 
Party of Regions 32.12 186 n.a. 
Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc 22.27 122 n.a 
Our Ukraine 13.94 81 n.a. 
SPU 5.67 33 n.a. 
CPU 3.66 21 n.a. 
Peoples’ Opposition (Vitrenko) 2.93 – n.a. 
Lytvyn Bloc 2.43 – n.a. 
Ukrainian Peoples’ Bloc 1.87 – n.a. 
Viche 1.74 – n.a. 
Pora 1.47 – n.a. 
Others  – n.a. 
Total  443  
 
The fact that the left-wing parties serve as supporters of a government ema-
nating from the Party of Regions is not surprising, given the regional factor. 
Moreover, it seems that the ‘Orange camp’ was fatally incapable of main-
taining negotiations with the SPU leader Oleksandr Moroz, who initially 
supported the Orange coalition exclusively on mutually beneficial conditi-
ons.25 In other words, the political force that flexed its muscles in 1998 prov-
ed capable of playing a crucial role in 2006, despite the losses in electoral 
support.  
On the other hand, the fusion of CPU defence of the working class and 
the Party of Regions position as defenders of managerial capitalism hints at 
the logic of post-Communist manipulations. Both parties were formed in one 
single region, Donbass and Donetsk oblast. If we compare the election re-
sults of 1998 and 2006, it is evident that the CPU votes did not go to another 
leftist party, but to the Party of Regions. This suggests that the former CPU 
and leftist elites have failed in forming a ruling class, but not that the Eastern 
elites have shed their ambition of appropriating for themselves the political 
centre. Since September 2006, the Yanukovich government has attempted to 
remove ministers appointed by president Yushchenko from government, 
launched the sensitive issue of making Russian a second state language for 
Ukraine, intruded into the presidential realm of foreign and security policies 
and in general revealed maximalist attitudes in co-opting state functions in 
the Rada and the government. This has in turn prompted Yushchenko to re-
consider the constitutional amendment from 2004, paving the way for the 
proportional electoral system. The most populous region of Ukraine, and in 
many ways also the most influential one, has produced a new political force: 
this may testify to the fact that leftist ideas and values have failed altogether 
                                                 
24  This does not apply, since the elections were fully proportional. 
25  As chairman of the Rada in 1998–2002, Moroz had a vested interest in the reforms of 
2004 toward a parliamentary system, and naturally also a professional interest in the 
chairmanship. The decision to enter into coalition with the Party of the Regions and the 
CPU may have jeopardized party unity however, as several SPU members have started to 
talk about changing the SPU leadership.  
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and that Ukraine has entered a period of ‘de-ideologization’. If so, then ide-
ologies may rise again on a completely different foundation than in the 
1990s.  
Conclusion 
According to Jürgen Habermas, an identity based on common sense is first 
and foremost one that supports the constitution, civic rights and the account-
ability of politics versus society (See Flikke & Kisselyov, 2006). The appli-
cability of this to the countries in transition is a topic for discussion. In these 
countries, the political system is indeed in rapid change, likewise the parts of 
the national constitutions regulating power relations among institutions of 
government, and also the electoral system. Ukraine has undergone a rapid 
and considerable change of electoral rules accompanied by a subsequent 
sharp rise in elite competition. The major contenders in politics have been 
sculpting their strategies while the system itself has not been settled. This 
has impacted on the possibilities for identifying with a specific political sys-
tem, and in the absence of a fixed system, other markers may enter into force 
– such as cultural ones.  
The focus of transition studies on norm internalization is difficult to 
measure, given the quickly changing electoral framework of the period from 
1998 to 2006, let alone the falsifications of the 2004 elections. Moreover, the 
fact that the 2006 elections have produced several attempts to form a gov-
ernment of ‘Orange’ and Westernized elites, with subsequent debates bout 
the coalition, its values and its constituents, and finally a return of the East-
ern-based elites to government in August 2006, indicates that elections do 
not settle the score in a final way. What we see is a continuous struggle be-
tween the elites for establishing a final set of values in Ukrainian political 
life, a struggle that does not end with the proclamation of winners and losers 
in the elections. 
The CPU and the Party of Regions express political sentiments and val-
ues that emanate from the Eastern regions of Ukraine. These values are 
linked to paternalism, a cultural orientation further eastwards towards Rus-
sia, and less focus on civic liberties.26 Then again, the maturity of society 
with regard to new democratic values is an open question. Research on val-
ues in Ukraine conducted in 2003 revealed that, on the whole, few respon-
dents seem highly concerned with civic freedoms: 7.3% agree that a ‘high 
level of individual freedom’ should be granted, 23.8% that it should be 
‘above average’, 47.2% that it should be ‘average’, 14.5% ‘less than aver-
age’, and 7.2% ‘low’ (Zhaden et al., 2004: 33). Hence, if the Party of Re-
gions wants electoral support, it will need to adjust to a new set of values, or 
follow the path of For a United Ukraine. This will mean adjusting to a 
pragmatic and less ‘bossy’ style of politics. This is also confirmed by the 
decline of the left-wing parties, which have traditionally paid greater heed to 
ideological questions. Left-wing parties, which depend on ideology and 
forge their organizations on collective incentives, would appear to have few 
                                                 
26  The Party of Regions often claims that the inclination toward Russia is basically due to 
strong economic ties with Russia, but this is not the only factor. 
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chances of developing further in Ukraine. Whether the Party of Regions has 
this possibility will remain an issue for future elections. 
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